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In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic 
responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to 
the notion of justification. 'Being semantically responsible' is shown to involve 
the fulfilment of cognitive duties which allow the agent to engage in the kind 
of reason-laden discourses which render her beliefs appropriately sensitive to 
correction. The concept of semantic responsibility suggests that the notion of 
belief found in contemporary philosophical debates about content implicitly 
encompasses radically different classes of beliefs. In what follows I make 
those different types explicit, and sketch some implications for naturalisation 
projects in semantics and for accounts of the (putative) non-conceptual 




In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility that is to the 
notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. I 
propose to call it semantic responsibility. The concept of semantic responsibility 
highlights the fulfilment of certain personal level cognitive duties regarding 
the holding or withholding of a belief. To fulfil these duties is for a subject to 
be capable of what I call forward-looking tuneability by reasons, i.e. to engage in 
inferential practices in which the subject can be prompted to corrections by 
reasons. Evidently, not all beliefs require for their entertainment the subject's 
capacity to engage in these kinds of inferential practice. Most (but by no 
means all) perceptual beliefs, for example, involve no such personal level 
cognitive duties. The concept of semantic responsibility thus suggests that the 
notion of belief found in contemporary philosophical debates about content 
implicitly encompasses radically different classes of beliefs. It will part of my 
task here to make those different types explicit. 
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The thesis I want to defend is that the cognitive role of the beliefs which 
exhibit self-critical openness is so importantly different from the cognitive 
role of beliefs not thus critically open that it becomes fruitful to regard the 
two as exemplars of different cognitive kinds. We are semantically responsible 
only towards those of our beliefs thus open to reason-based correction. I shall 
use a deontological conception of epistemic justification as the anchor point 
from which to develop this notion of semantic responsibility. An adequate 
characterisation of this notion will also require some discussion of the issue of 
voluntary control, since the plausibility of deontological conceptions of 
epistemic justification is often presented as requiring that our beliefs be under 
voluntary control (see e.g. Alston, 1988). Let it be clear, however, that I do not 
intend to contribute directly to the epistemological debate, and that the notion 
of semantic responsibility is not intended to replace or even support the notion 
of epistemic responsibility as it is usually invoked within that debate. In 
general, my main contention is that, even if deontological approaches fail to 
yield a general notion of justification in epistemology, a responsibilist 
conception of belief is both plausible and essential if we are to characterise the 
special variety of belief involved in reason-sensitive thought1. 
The paper is organised as follows. I first sketch the main claims made by 
deontological models of justification and briefly examine some of the 
arguments against them (Section 2). In Section 3, I analyse the notion of 
control and its relation to the notion of responsibility. I then turn (Section 4) to 
the notion of belief itself. First, the notion of semantic responsibility is spelled 
out. 'Being semantically responsible' is shown to involve the fulfilment of 
cognitive duties which allow the agent to engage in the kind of reason-laden 
discourse which renders her appropriately sensitive to correction —a 
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condition I'll call 'tuneability'. Second, I offer a taxonomy of types of belief 
based on whether (and how) the conditions of semantic responsibility are 
met. The main distinction is between what I label mindful, and mindless beliefs. 
Mindful belief requires that the agent be semantically responsible for 
embracing the belief. Appreciation of the semantic commitments undertaken 
when entertaining a specific belief is thus essential for membership in this 
category of beliefs. Mindless beliefs are the beliefs of a well functioning 
adaptive agent who is, however, not semantically responsible. Finally (Section 
5) I briefly sketch some possible implications of this notion of semantic 
responsibility. I suggest that core issues concerning naturalisation projects in 
semantics can be clarified using this notion, and that the proposed taxonomy 
of beliefs offers a new and interesting angle on debates concerning the 
(putative) non-conceptual content of perceptual experiences. 
 
2. EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Even though general agreement about the precise characterisation of 
knowledge as a form of justified true belief looks to be unobtainable in the 
post-Gettier epistemological world (cf. Gettier, 1963), there still remains a 
broad consensus concerning an intimate relationship between knowledge and 
the justification of belief. The nature of the required notion of justification is, 
unfortunately, a controversial matter. Reliabilist and responsibilist 
conceptions of epistemic justification emerge as the strongest competitors in 
the debate, with reliabilists stressing the need for truth-conduciveness and 
responsibilists stressing the fulfilment of epistemic duties2. 
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The defining characteristic of epistemic responsibilism seems to be the idea 
that epistemological terms such as justification, evidence, warrant, etc. are 
best understood in some very strongly normative fashion, i.e., as relating to 
notions of requirement, duty, blame, obligation, and the like. This normative 
dimension can be seen in the following passage (Chisholm, 1982, p. 7): 
 
The simplest way of setting forth the vocabulary of the theory of 
evidence, or epistemology, is to take as undefined the locution, "__ is 
more reasonable than __ for S at t" (or alternatively, "__ is epistemically 
preferable to __ for S at t"). Epistemic reasonability could be 
understood in terms of the general requirement to try to have the 
largest possible set of logically independent beliefs that is such that the 
true beliefs outnumber the false beliefs. The principles of epistemic 
preferability are the principles one should follow if one is to fulfill this 
requirement. 
 
Being justified in believing that p is thus a matter of degree but also, and most 
importantly, a matter of fulfilling certain epistemic duties so that we tend to 
accept only those beliefs that are most likely to be true. To reach what 
Chisholm calls 'positive epistemic status' is for an agent to fulfil a certain 
epistemic responsibility, that of trying to succeed in achieving a certain state 
of intellectual excellence by bringing about a situation in which one's beliefs 
are mostly true3. This connection between epistemic justification and 
epistemic responsibility is sometimes cashed out in terms of 
(un)blameworthiness. 'A subject (S) is justified in believing that p' is presented 
as having the same truth-conditions as 'S deserves not to be blamed for 
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believing that p' (see e.g. Bedford Naylor, 1988). The subject, in turn, deserves 
(not) to be blamed for believing that p only if she has voluntary control over 
the entertainment of her belief. Deontological accounts thus seem to require 
the truth of doxastic voluntarism, i.e., the truth of the idea that believing or 
not believing that p is within the agent's power. It is this notion of voluntary 
control and, in particular, its relationship to (epistemic and other kinds of) 
responsibility that interests me here. To better see what's at issue, I shall focus 
on one particular version of the anti-deontologist argument, that of William 
Alston (1988). 
According to Alston, we can distinguish two fundamental categories within 
the notion of voluntary control: direct (or basic) and indirect (or non-basic) 
control4. To say that we have direct voluntary control over our beliefs would 
be equivalent to saying that our beliefs are the result of an act of will, in the 
same way that raising my arm is the result of an act of will5. The general 
agreement though is that we do not in this sense have direct voluntary control 
over any of our beliefs. All beliefs, but especially perceptual beliefs, impose 
themselves upon us without such direct mediation from the will. Forming the 
belief that it's raining is just not comparable to the raising of one's arm. No 
matter how much effort I put into it when I perceive rain through my 
window, I cannot help but believe that it's raining, whether I want to believe 
it or not. There are many beliefs which the subject can't help but form in her 
dealings with the environment; beliefs which are, very often, unconscious. For 
Alston, most of our beliefs are of this kind. 
So, we don't seem to have direct control over any of our beliefs, but do we 
have indirect control over some of them? The only kind of indirect control 
that Alston accepts is what he calls 'indirect voluntary influence', which is 
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control over, not the belief itself, but the processes which lead to the forming 
of a belief. The activities that seem relevant as controllable activities are those 
that either influence particular episodes of belief fixation (e.g., for how long 
and with which methods I pursue a given matter) or that affect our belief 
forming habits in general (e.g. checking as many sources as possible for any 
given belief. See Alston, op. cit., pp. 278-279). Again, perceptual beliefs are 
presented as paradigm cases of beliefs over which we don't have this kind of 
indirect control either, as opposed to the beliefs that we form when we engage 
in more sophisticated activities such as discussing art, politics, or philosophy. 
Over these more sophisticated beliefs, we do seem to have indirect voluntary 
influence, and as long as we thus have indirect voluntary influence over the 
actions or activities which bring about the beliefs, then we can be held 
responsible for them (Ibid., p. 278). The idea is that, if after having properly 
engaged in all these indirect activities we come to believe that p, we are 
justified in our belief. However, even if we could thus be held responsible for 
the views we come to believe in e.g. philosophy or politics or art, we cannot 
be considered responsible for most of our beliefs since most of our beliefs are 
perceptual (Ibid., pp. 265-266). 
Alston's position can thus be reconstructed as follows: we have no direct 
control over any of our beliefs, but we do have indirect control over a small 
subset of them. We can thus be held accountable for this subset. This is a 
limited result which fails to deliver a general notion of justification in 
deontological terms. A responsibilist notion of justification is thus deemed 
inappropriate for general epistemological purposes. Behind this conclusion 
lies the implicit assumption that we are justified in believing most of our 
beliefs (let's call this assumption P0) and that as a result the failure of the 
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responsibilist treatment to justify the majority of our beliefs counts against 
that treatment itself. To rehearse the argument in a bit more detail: 
 
(P1) A subject is justified in believing p only if she fulfils her epistemic 
responsibility regarding p6. 
 
(P2) A subject fulfils her epistemic responsibility regarding p only if 
believing p is under her (direct or indirect) voluntary control. 
 
(P3) Subjects do not have (direct) voluntary control over any their beliefs. 
 
(P4) Subjects do not have (indirect) voluntary control over most of their 
beliefs. 
 
Now, at this point the conclusion ought to be: 
 
(C1) Subjects are not (deontologically) justified in believing most of their 
beliefs. 
However, given the implicit premise: 
 
(P0) we are justified in believing most of our beliefs, 
 
we reach Alston's own conclusion: 
 




I believe instead in the truth of C1 (more about this below), but regardless of 
my intuitions at this point, what is surely true is that C1, in itself, is not 
enough to get Alston what he wants. It's only against the background of P0 
that the argument becomes the kind of reductio that Alston intended, a reductio 
of the view that epistemic responsibility constitutes the key element in 
epistemic justification. Belief in P0, in turn, probably flows from the 
reliabilism inherent to Alston's position: perceptual beliefs are, under normal 
circumstances, highly reliable, i.e. highly truth-conducive. Most of our beliefs 
are perceptual. Therefore we are justified in believing most of our beliefs. 
In the next sections I'll try to show that the worries about voluntary control 
subtly mislocate the real issues, at least regarding the most semantically 
interesting sub-class of beliefs7. The first step in my argument is a further 
analysis of the notion of control that lies behind Alston's position. 
 
3. VOLUNTARY CONTROL AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Alston argues that we have no direct control over any of our beliefs and no 
indirect control over the majority of our beliefs. Interestingly though, he says 
very little, if anything, about the notion of control itself. While clarifying the 
relevant concept of control may not matter for some purposes8, I believe such 
an analysis can help bring to the fore key assumptions, not only about the 
notion of control itself, but about the explanatory links between the notions of 
control and responsibility. 




The basic point to be noted here is that one has control over a given 
type of state only if one also has control over some field of 
incompatible alternatives. To have control over believing that p is to 
have control over whether one believes that p or not. 
 
We do not have direct voluntary control over any of our beliefs because we do 
not believe at will that propositions of any kind are true (or false)9. It is not up 
to me to freely choose to believe that I am not in pain when I am suffering a 
headache. It is not up to me to freely choose to believe that the moon is or is 
not made of green cheese. One can imagine such things or even freely choose 
to look for evidence for them. Yet, when one chooses to look for evidence of 
the truth of a particular proposition, what is freely chosen, what is controlled, 
are not the beliefs themselves, but the actions that affect the processes which 
produce the beliefs. We thus enter the realm of indirect influence. This is a 
limited realm since we do not have even this indirect voluntary control over 
most of our beliefs: most of them —perceptual beliefs, especially— are just not 
the kind of beliefs for which we have much choice over methods, techniques 
or habits. 
Alston's understanding of both the notion of direct and of indirect control 
thus turns on the idea of the agent having free choice over what to believe. Yet, 
such an idea of free choice is not an essential feature of the concept of control 
in most everyday contexts where this concept plays an important role. We 
don't think of the moon as having any free choice in the way it controls the 
tide. We don't think of a thermostat as having any free choice in the way it 
controls the temperature. Even in cybernetics and automata theory, where the 
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notion of control has been technically elaborated10, the idea of being able to 
freely choose among alternatives does not play any role. 
Of course, it could be argued that such observations are germane only when 
‘control’ means more or less something like ‘cause’, and that this notion of 
control is not the one we are talking about when we talk about voluntary 
control over action or over the holding or withholding of a belief11. In a sense, 
I accept this. My view is that it is only when control gets tied up with 
responsibility that free choice suddenly matters. The thermostatic or cybernetic 
sense is invoked precisely to stress the difference between a merely 
mechanistic understanding of the notion of control and the notion which plays 
a central role in historically central epistemological debates12 or in discourses 
involving moral agency. These latter discourses are the natural home of this 
freedom-oriented understanding of control. It is in this domain that the 
notion of control gets uncomfortably enmeshed with the metaphysical 
problem of free will. Deontological considerations in general seem to be 
deeply intertwined with this problem (Steup, 1988, p. 68): 
 
Questions of this [deontological] kind arise only if the agent was 
responsible for the act under consideration. If it wasn't within the 
agent's power to refrain from doing what he did, then he can't be 
blamed for what he did, and then his act would be an improper object 
for deontic evaluation. Hence an act is a proper object for deontic 
evaluation only if it is a 'free' act in the sense that it was within the 
agent's power to refrain from performing it. 
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Moral responsibility and free will are issues I don't plan to engage here13, but 
there is one point I would like to discuss: it concerns the shape of the 
explanatory links between control and responsibility. For it seems to me that 
Alston and others have got the explanatory direction between control and 
responsibility wrong. The idea of an agent freely choosing between some set 
of alternatives for action in a particular situation is itself applicable only once 
the conditions for responsibility have been met. It is not so much that 
responsibility depends on control, as that control exists when (other) 
conditions for responsibility are met. Actions belong in the space of praise 
and blame when they already belong to situations where the notion of 
responsibility gets a grip. All the legal systems in (at least) the western world 
are based precisely on this idea. For a person to be legally responsible is for 
her to be involved in a situation where blame, in the form of punishment, 
makes sense. It is for her to meet whatever conditions are deemed necessary 
for being judged (blamed or exonerated) in a court of law. The court of law 
then decides whether she lacked control over her actions in any way that 
affects her legal status. In the moral domain, we encounter the same scenario. 
We are responsible for e.g. the child that someone has abandoned at our 
doorstep, for the people injured in a car accident, or for the future of Kosovo, 
not because we have (direct or indirect) voluntary control over those 
situations or over the processes that ended up producing those situations, but 
because the actions by which we engage those situations are properly subject 
to praise or blame. In general, we do not have responsibility because we 
freely choose to do x or y. Rather, we are said to freely choose to do x or y 
because we meet other conditions for responsibility14. 
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My claim is thus that the kind of control relevant to our discussion exists 
precisely where certain other conditions for responsibility are met. In the next 
Section I lay out these other conditions for the notion of, in particular, semantic 
responsibility. They comprise both the idea of a properly functioning subject 
and of a subject that is capable of fulfilling certain intellectual obligations. It's 
only when these conditions are met that issues about voluntary control 
regarding the holding or withholding of belief make sense. Alston is thus 
right to present perceptual beliefs as having little relevance to a deontological 
conception of epistemic justification, but for the wrong reasons. It is not 
because we do not have control over them. It is because we don't have 
intellectual obligations toward them, or, as I would like to put it, because the 
conditions for semantic responsibility have not been met. 
The hypothetical commitment to the truth of a belief that occurs when the 
conditions of semantic responsibility are met brings with it the idea that the 
subject could have, if prompted, modified some of the processes involved in 
coming to her beliefs. Being semantically responsible for a belief thus involves 
the idea that the subject could have changed the actions affecting those belief-
forming processes. To say that the agent could have done that is to say only 
that the agent is capable of what we can call forward-looking tuneability by 
reasons. The idea here is very close to Dennett's take on the issue of control in 
relation to what he calls the 'could have done otherwise' principle in 
discussions of free will (cf. Dennett, 1984). The ‘could have done otherwise’ 
principle can only be sensibly interpreted, Dennett claims, as the possibility of 
a properly functioning agent modifying her actions in the future as the result 
of being prompted to corrections by the provision of training or feedback. 
Learning is thus of the essence. Someone ‘could have done otherwise’ only if 
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she is able to learn from the particular outcome of her actions; only if she is 
‘cognitively tuneable’ so as to act differently when facing the ‘same’ situation 
in the future (cf. Dennett, 1984, pp. 139-144). This Dennettian view lies behind 
the idea expressed here by the phrase 'the agent should have known better' 
used to characterise semantic responsibility. What is perhaps less explicitly 
Dennettian is just the further insistence on the inferential, reason-laden 
character of the requisite tuneability. The requisite kind of tuneability, to be 
clear, is tuneability, not by the administration of drugs or hypnosis, but by the 
exchange of reasons and arguments. 
Despite getting the explanatory links between the notions of control and 
responsibility wrong, there is a lesson to be learnt from Alston's criticisms. By 
pointing out where a deontological conception of epistemic justification 
works and where it does not work, he provides useful information, not only 
about epistemic justification but also about the nature of the beliefs involved in 
the epistemic process. There emerge two distinct groups: those (the fewest) 
susceptible to a deontological treatment, and those (the majority) not 
susceptible to such a treatment: in the main, perceptual beliefs. I find this 
taxonomy revealing though still somewhat too austere, as I shall argue in the 
next Section. 
 
4. A TAXONOMY OF BELIEFS 
 
Let me start by providing a rough characterisation of what I'd like to call 
semantic responsibility. A subject S is semantically responsible for believing 
that p iff the following two conditions are met: i) S is a properly functioning 
cognitive system and ii) S could reasonably have been expected to fulfil her 
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intellectual obligations. To fulfil one's intellectual obligations is, in this 
context, to appreciate the semantic commitments that one undertakes when 
holding or withholding a belief and to be ready to engage in reason-giving 
discourses concerning that belief. When these conditions for semantic 
responsibility are met, then praise or blame become appropriate. 
A word or two about why the conditions above pertain to the semantic and 
not to the epistemological domain. To talk about semantic responsibility does 
indeed suggest that there is something about the contents of the beliefs which 
implies commitments or obligations. One could understand this normative 
status as pertaining to the concepts through which the beliefs are articulated, 
and perhaps through the meaning of the words that express these concepts. 
Certain versions of conceptual role semantics, e.g. Brandom’s account in 
Making it Explicit, do indeed suggest something of this kind15. However, the 
view I defend remains neutral concerning whether the deontological 
component of beliefs comes from the concepts involved in them, or the 
meanings of the words that express them. The normativity captured by the 
notion of semantic responsibility doesn’t necessarily involve, on my account, 
any kind of linguistic articulation and therefore it is not necessarily linked to a 
conceptual role view of the inferential structures among concepts. Even 
though my proposal does invoke normative commitments for mental states 
such as belief, it doesn’t require —as e.g. Brandom’s proposal does— a 
linguistic characterisation of the content of such mental states. This is largely 
because the notion of intellectual obligations invoked in (ii) has to be 
understood against the background of a paradigmatically non-propositional 
ability; the ability to realise that a particular situation requires of the agent to 
 16 
step back and critically appraise the situation. This, hopefully, will become 
clearer below, as I develop this notion of intellectual obligations. 
A related caveat. The notion of semantic responsibility should not be 
interpreted as a species of epistemic responsibility. As I said at the beginning 
of the paper, the detour through the epistemological views discussed in the 
previous sections was necessary only to properly locate this deontological 
notion within the realm of belief. There may be further developments of this 
notion which could affect the relationships between the notion of (different 
kinds of) belief and knowledge, but that issue is certainly one which lies 
beyond the scope of this paper16. 
With these clarifications in place, we can now start exploiting some of 
Alston's epistemologically oriented examples to illustrate the kind of 
taxonomy that results if we take the notion of semantic responsibility as our 
key criterion for distinguishing between varieties of belief. The first situation 
I'd like to look at involves a clear-cut case of 'cognitive deficiency'. Take, for 
example, a person suffering from senile dementia who falsely believes her 
neighbour’s dog is a dangerous animal. It seems likely that she cannot be 
blamed for the wrongness of this belief because at least one of the two 
conditions for semantic responsibility has not been met: the subject is not a 
properly functioning cognitive system. In a case like this, we can talk of 
pathological beliefs, i.e., beliefs which are the outcome of some physical 
malfunction in the subject and for which therefore the subject is not 
semantically responsible17. 
Of course, the concept of cognitive deficiency has many faces. It is interesting 
to see how Alston presents it in a very mild form, namely, as whatever 
cognitive property a college student who can't correctly understand Locke's 
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views possesses. The case is supposed to illustrate the ultimate insufficiency of 
epistemic responsibility for epistemic justification18. As Alston depicts the 
situation, the suggestion is that the student can't help but believe something 
false. In particular, the student believes: 
 
(L) According to Locke, everything is a matter of opinion, 
 
instead of believing 
 
(K) According to Locke, one's knowledge is restricted to one's ideas. 
 
Even though it is not clear exactly what 'cognitive deficiency' means in this 
situation, the case is presented as one of neurally-based cognitive difference 
or malfunction19. Alston insists that there is nothing the student can do to 
improve his understanding of Locke. The student " ... doesn't have what it 
takes to follow abstract philosophical exposition or reasoning" (op. cit., p. 287). 
This seems to suggest an interpretation of the case as indeed an example of 
(mild) cognitive disorder. One worry is Alston's further claim that the 
student's confidence in the correctness of his understanding will eventually 
be shaken when he gets a bad grade in the final exam. It could be argued that 
if we are to regard the student as a rational agent, we should at least insist on 
the possibility that he'll learn to withhold his belief in (L), even if he never 
comes to believe (K) (see Steup, 1988, p. 80). However, what matters here is 
not so much that the student learns to withhold belief in (L), since he can be 
taught to do that by sheer force (a few electric shocks might do it!). Rather, 
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what counts is that he actually comes to understand (K). The latter, however, 
is ruled out by Alston's depiction of the case. 
But now consider a different reading of the student's cognitive deficiency: one 
involving what might be better dubbed cognitive lassitude or cognitive 
thoughtlessness. Here we are assuming that the student has the potential to get 
things right, but (for whatever reasons) he simply fails to use this potential. 
Here, we can claim that in some concrete sense the student should have known 
better. It now makes sense to place the student within the space of 
responsibility, expecting him to be capable of learning that (K) by way of 
reasoned discourse. It is this notion of engaging the agent with reasons for 
believing (or not believing) that is important for the notion of learning I have 
in mind. When I claim that we expect the student to improve his performance, 
the idea is that we expect him to do so, not through some method of physical 
conditioning, but via the understanding of the reasons that would justify such 
a change. 
The underlying assumption for this second scenario is thus that i) there is no 
physical malfunction that completely prevents improvements in the student's 
understanding and ii) that if the student had indeed fulfilled all his 
intellectual obligations —i.e., if he had carefully read and thought about 
Locke's text and about the professor's explanations—, then he would have 
believed (K) and not (L). We thus place the student within the space of 
culpable error for it seems that ultimately there is something he should have 
done and hasn't. The student's belief, on this scenario, belongs to the category 
of what I will now call mindful beliefs. A belief belongs to this category if and 
only if the subject who holds the belief can be held semantically responsible 
for holding it, i.e., if both conditions for semantic responsibility are met.  
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So far I have portrayed cases of pathological beliefs, i.e., cases in which 
subjects cannot be held semantically responsible because they are 
malfunctioning cognitive systems and cases of mindful beliefs, i.e., situations 
involving subjects who can be held semantically responsible because the two 
conditions of semantic responsibility are clearly met. I next introduce a third 
category, which I'll call mindless beliefs. Mindless beliefs are those held by 
subjects who are properly functioning cognitive systems but who fail to meet 
the other condition of semantic responsibility. Most, but certainly not all, 
perceptual beliefs belong to this category. Think, for example, of forming the 
perceptual belief that there are three steps in front of you as you walk out of 
your front door. Your body movements adjust accordingly, but you fall on the 
fourth step. Some kind of perceptual illusion has taken place. The environment 
has played a 'trick' on you. This is the kind of situation in which, despite 
normal functioning, you accrue no semantic responsibility for your belief. 
You are not semantically responsible because there is nothing that you could 
reasonably have been expected to do to avoid forming the belief that led to 
the fall. 
But wait! Surely, you may say, the person who suffered this particular kind of 
perceptual illusion has done everything that could reasonably have been 
expected of her to fulfil her intellectual obligations. Yet, I claim, she accrues 
no semantic responsibility for her perceptual belief which thus belongs to the 
mindless category. How are we to resolve this apparent tension? The tension 
reveals itself as merely apparent once we spell out in more detail the notion of 
intellectual obligations involved in the second of the two conditions for 
semantic responsibility. First of all, notice that the idea of an agent’s fulfilling 
her intellectual obligations cannot and should not be assimilated to something 
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like the agent —or better, the agent’s sub-personal mechanisms— merely 
meeting some kind of computational or inferential constraints. “Intellectual” 
here has a stronger, reason-laden character, that demands more than the idea of 
inferentially —but sub-personal— articulated transitions between mental 
states. 
At the same time, however, it is essential to realise that what is required of the 
mindfully believing agent is not that she/he be constantly ready to engage in 
a critical revision of all her/his beliefs. Nor should the agent be continuously 
critically assessing all her/his mindful beliefs. What is required is that the 
agent be capable of (personal level) critical engagement and possessed of an 
additional, and quite specific, kind of know-how, ability or skill, namely, the 
ability to automatically (courtesy of well-trained sub-personal processes) 
recognise a situation as one requiring her to step back and exercise some 
critical appraisal. 
This knowing-how —knowing how to spot the kinds of situation in which 
one needs to step back and critically appraise one’s beliefs— cannot itself be 
—unlike the intellectual processes it triggers— reason-laden. My account 
would then involve an infinite regress. The situations which require an 
exercise of the agent’s intellectual obligations must simply pop-out to the agent 
in a non-reasoned, unmediated way. I thus like to call that necessary —but 
wholly sub-personal— component of the notion of semantic responsibility 
‘critical pop-out’. As a kind of know-how, we deploy it in an automatic 
fashion and it thus belongs —to repeat— to the sub-personal level. The 
capacity to effectively fulfil our intellectual obligations requires that certain 
situations (sub-personally) pop-out to the agent as situations requiring of a 
certain critical reflection. This notion of pop-out should thus be viewed as the 
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rule-stopper which triggers the rule-following personal level activity courtesy 
of which an agent fulfils her intellectual obligations. The point is that only 
agents possessing the sub-personal skill of ‘critical pop-out’ and capable (once 
this has occurred) of understanding and responding to reasons (the personal 
level component) can be treated as a “responsible believers”. 
If we now revisit the example about falling down the stairs, we can appreciate 
what is missing, and hence, what makes the belief that led to the fall mindless 
despite appearances to the contrary. It is that the pre-requisite critical pop-
out, that grounds the practical fulfilment of the subject’s intellectual 
obligations, is unavailable. The situation does not pop-out to the agent as one 
requiring of any further appraisal. Under such circumstances the subject 
accrues no responsibility, semantic or otherwise.  
A possible worry at this stage is that the division between mindless and 
mindful beliefs now seems too close to the familiar distinction between tacit 
and explicit beliefs (see e.g. Dennett, 1987). However, this worry disappears if 
we rehearse the terms in which each pair of notions have been characterised. 
Let us say that a belief is tacit if it is neither explicitly tokened, nor implied by 
beliefs that are explicitly tokened, but is in a sense emergent out of patterns in 
systemic behaviour (e.g. Dennett’s example in which a chess-playing program 
‘thinks it should get its queen out early’, despite this proposition not being 
explicitly tokened anywhere in the program. See Dennett, 1981, p. 107. See 
also Davies, 1986 and 1989). And let us call a belief ‘explicit’ if it is both 
tokened and occurrent. Then a belief may be mindless yet explicit. Such a belief 
could be a consciously held one, but one that I am in no way disposed to 
critically appraise. Without further learning on my part, such a belief will 
never be the object of an episode of critical pop-out. Could a belief be mindful 
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yet tacit? By the same token, yes. If, without further learning, the system 
could, under some circumstances, both make the belief explicit and make it an 
object of critical reflection, then it counts as mindful already (the expert 
chess–player who has never yet remarked her tendency to get her queen out 
early, but who is quite capable of noticing and scrutinising this tendency if 
things started to go wrong, may be such a case). The lesson: the notion of 
mindfulness concerns a disposition to make a belief explicit. Thus, the 
mindful/mindless distinction cannot itself be equivalent to the explicit / tacit 
distinction, the latter distinction being not in the least a dispositional one. 
Notice also that although the self-critical conduct essential to semantic 
responsibility occurs at the personal level, it needs to be triggered by the sub-
personal ability which I’ve called ‘critical pop-out’. The distinction between 
mindful and mindless beliefs built upon the notion of semantic responsibility 
thus straddles the personal / sub-personal arena. As a result some of our 
perceptual beliefs should be considered mindful according to the present 
taxonomy. It would thus be a misinterpretation of my proposal to view it as 
an attempt to preserve some kind of (semantic) responsibilism for non-
perceptual beliefs while giving it up for perceptual beliefs. 
There are, indeed, cases in which the formation of a perceptual belief is the 
result of having engaged in some rather complex inferential process. If we 
could reasonably be expected to alter those processes so as to become 'better 
perceivers', then the resulting perceptual beliefs would not count as mindless, 
but rather mindful beliefs, according to my taxonomy. Becoming a better 
perceiver thus means acquiring the ability to spot those situations which 
require critical appraisal. Such a recognition may not alter the content of a 
belief itself, but it does affect the functional poise and normative status of that 
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content. Unless we want to divorce the notions of content, functional poise, 
and content-normativity, the resulting picture is one that belongs naturally to 
the realm of semantics. Think, for instance, of all those people who claim they 
just don't see (and hence don't form the belief) that the trash bag is full, and 
consequently never come to believe that the trash needs to be taken out. It is 
possible to imagine a training program for these subjects (some of whom I 
happen to know) such that they might learn to better detect full trash bags in 
their environment. The content of the representation before and after this 
training program would, in one sense, be the same since we are assuming that 
the subjects were actually able to see the full trash bags before the program. 
What the training does is to change the functional poise and normative status 
of such a content by inculcating a new inferential link, and engendering a new 
skill which allows those situations to pop-out to the subject. 
Such examples suggest further nuances to the taxonomy presented here. I 
take this to be a good sign, since controversial situations as regards the status 
of different kinds of belief can thus be illuminated using these criteria of 
semantic responsibility. I would like to look briefly at two puzzling cases 
again due to Alston. In the first one, we are asked to imagine an isolated 
primitive community where subjects have no opportunity whatsoever to 
gather any other evidence than the evidence provided by the rigid network of 
cultural structures and traditions of the tribe. As a result of this, they end up 
believing many false things. The point Alston wants to make is that, even 
when a subject thus complies with whatever standards of intellectual 
obligation it is reasonable to expect in that community, it is often the case that 
the subject will end up with a belief that looks epistemically unjustified. 
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From the point of view of the current taxonomy, the interest of this example 
lies in the fact that it displays a situation in which, depending on how we 
understand the modality involved in the second of our conditions for 
semantic responsibility, we can end up with either a case of mindless or 
mindful belief. When understood in a restricted fashion, the ‘could’ in the 
expression ‘the subject could reasonably have been expected to fulfil her 
intellectual obligations’ is interpreted as indicating that the subject's 
capabilities are constrained by the particular features of her social, historical 
and material environment. If the environment doesn’t provide whatever is 
necessary to e.g. become critical of one’s tradition, what one 'could reasonably 
expect' as the fulfilment of someone's intellectual obligations is just the 
acceptance of the tribe’s doctrine. Hence, under this restricted understanding 
of 'could', the answer to whether, given the circumstances, it is reasonable to 
expect the subject to fulfil her intellectual duties is 'no'20. The subject is thus in 
no position to be semantically blamed for her beliefs. 
The wrongness of the belief is here depicted as closer to the wrongness of a 
belief based on a perceptual illusion: in each case there is nothing the agent 
could have done to alter her belief states. In fact, the main difference between 
this case (thus construed) and that of a perceptual illusion is that we now 
have a wider understanding of the notion of 'environment' when we speak of 
the environment playing a 'trick' on the subject: for we now include the social 
environment. A restricted interpretation of the second condition for semantic 
responsibility thus assigns the tribe's members' beliefs to the mindless 
category. 
Now, what about the unrestricted version of the ‘could’ in the phrase ‘could 
reasonably have been expected to fulfil her intellectual obligations’? When 
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thus interpreted, there is an implicit reference to a less tightly constrained 
standard of inquiry that any human subject, regardless of her contextual, 
historical and material conditions, should meet in order to count as a 
semantically responsible agent. Under this interpretation, the member of 
Alston’s tribe failed to fulfil her true intellectual obligations and is thus 
semantically responsible for her false beliefs. She is thus in a position to be 
fully blamed for their wrongness since there are better methods of inquiry that 
such an agent could have followed in order to form beliefs. This 
interpretation of the second condition of semantic responsibility assigns the 
tribe’s members’ beliefs squarely to our category of mindful beliefs21. 
To acknowledge these two different readings does not require us to fix on one 
of them as the right understanding. The notion of ‘fulfilling one’s intellectual 
obligations’ can thus be understood as the following of the rules of the 
community or as critical thinking about these rules, depending on one’s 
interpretation of the modality expressed by ‘could’ in the second condition of 
the notion of semantic responsibility. In Alston's example and in similar 
situations, we tend to oscillate in our thinking between the two readings of 
'could' without being able to establish which interpretation is the most 
appropriate, not to mention which of the two gives the truth of the matter. I 
believe this is an inherent part of the thickness and richness of the social, 
moral and political discourses in which cases like these arise and are 
discussed. It is thus a virtue of the notion of semantic responsibility that it 
maintains the moral ambiguity while clarifying the key concerns. 
Finally, consider a different kind of puzzle case, one which Alston introduces 
to show that epistemic responsibility is not a necessary condition for 
epistemic justification. The situation is depicted as follows: a subject —
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Alston— neglects his epistemic duties and uncritically accepts someone's 
(Broom's) assessment of a candidate for a departmental post. If Alston had 
fulfilled his epistemic duties —e.g., to satisfy himself that Broom's opinions 
were trustworthy in these academic matters— he would, as it happens, have 
been misled into believing that Broom's opinions were not trustworthy, and he 
wouldn't have accepted Broom's advice. However, the evidence of Broom's 
unreliability is itself misleading and he (Broom) is perfectly trustworthy. So, 
all the available evidence would have supported the idea that Broom 
shouldn't be trusted in these matters, and would have undermined his 
assessment of the candidate. However, by luckily ignoring it, Alston ends up 
believing that which is true. According to Alston, this is a case in which the 
subject is epistemically justified in believing something while neglecting key 
epistemic duties —indeed, he is justified precisely because he neglects to fulfil 
them22. 
Looking at the example from the point of view of the present treatment, we 
can see that, regardless of whether or not the subject is epistemically justified, 
he —Alston, in the example— remains semantically responsible for his belief: 
he is a properly functioning cognitive system who could reasonably have 
been expected to fulfil his intellectual obligations (although he did not). 
Despite getting things right, he can and should be blamed for proceeding as he 
did, since the truth of his belief is now the result of some kind of lucky 
accident. The subject's belief is thus a clear example of mindful belief. 
What makes the realms of epistemic justification and of semantic 
responsibility so intimately related is that both involve a certain commitment 
of the subject to the truth of the belief. The important difference runs parallel 
to Frege's distinction between just thinking, 'the apprehension of a thought', 
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and actively judging, 'the recognition of the truth of a thought' (cf. Frege, 
1956). The recognition of truth involved in epistemic justification —to borrow 
one of Frege's expressions again— should be the result of 'appropriate 
investigations' in an empirical domain, whereas the hypothetical commitment 
to the truth of a belief that is simply entertained does not involve this 
empirical investigation23. Being semantically responsible is also being able to 
enter Sellars' 'space of reasons' (Sellars, 1963), i.e., being able to engage in an 
inferential practice of giving and asking for reasons. It's to be subject to a 
certain 'constitutive ideal of rationality' (cf. Davidson, 1970, p. 98), or to 
deploy what Brandom (1994, p. 5) calls a "mastery of proprieties of theoretical 
and practical inference". What we are calling mindful beliefs are thus the kinds 
of beliefs that most appropriately belong to the semantic realm, since in 
entertaining this kind of belief we reveal ourselves as participants in a variety 
of strongly normative practices. Mindful beliefs thus present, as I'll argue in 
the next Section, the very hardest case for a resolutely naturalistic treatment. 
 
5. SEMANTIC RESPONSIBILITY: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR? 
 
Let me end by commenting on two possible applications of this notion of 
semantic responsibility. One concerns the naturalisation of semantics. The 
other concerns the content of perceptual experience. Both are important issues 
and I clearly cannot do justice to them here, but let me at least present the 
outlines of what a fuller treatment might look like24.  
When assessing naturalisation projects in semantics, one important 
requirement is that these accounts leave room for the distinction between 
malfunction and misrepresentation, a distinction that is considered 
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constitutive of the normativity involved in truth-telling behaviour (see 
Haugeland, 1998). When trying to establish the plausibility of teleological 
proposals, in particular, this requirement has special relevance. In such 
accounts mental representations are understood as 'teleofunctional items', i.e., 
as items which are produced by biological mechanisms that have been 
designed or selected during evolutionary history to perform some 'proper 
function'. Given this characterisation of representation in terms of proper 
function, it has  recently been argued (Haugeland, 1998), teleological views 
cannot account for the required distinction between malfunction and 
misrepresentation. Here is how Haugeland (p. 310) presents his case: 
 
Imagine an insectivorous species of bird that evolved in an 
environment where most of the yellow butterflies are poisonous, and 
most others not; and suppose it has developed a mechanism for 
detecting and avoiding yellow butterflies. Then the point can be put 
this way: if a bird in good working order (with plenty of light, and so 
on) detects and rejects a (rare) nonpoisonous yellow butterfly, there 
can be no grounds for suggesting that it mistook that butterfly for a 
poisonous one; and similarly, if it detects and accepts a (rare) 
poisonous orange butterfly ... in such cases, ... there is nothing that the 
response can "mean" other than whatever actually elicits it in normal 
birds in normal conditions. 
 
I agree with Haugeland that we need to embrace a distinction between 
getting things wrong as the result of a malfunction in the system and getting 
things wrong when the system works normally. But I disagree about the final 
 29 
verdict for teleological accounts. The problem is that Haugeland's ontology is 
rather too austere to accommodate the genuine (but limited) virtues of this 
kind of naturalisation project. To accommodate the virtues while still 
displaying the limitations, it is helpful to exploit the taxonomy defended 
earlier. Here's how it works. 
For Haugeland "there can be no biological basis for understanding a system 
as functioning properly, but nevertheless misinforming" (Ibid.). However, this 
seems to be too fast. When looking at the bird example, there is surely a sense 
in which it does make sense to say —from a teleological point of view— that 
the bird 'made a mistake', even though there was no malfunction involved. 
The bird-species has learnt —although not by the exchange or appreciation of 
reasons— to use the perception of yellow as a sign of poison and has learnt to 
apply it appropriately (to avoid it) in a given task (foraging) in a given 
environment. All the mechanisms whose proper function is to detect yellow 
and to trigger an avoidance behaviour are working fine. The bird's behaviour 
follows a pattern predicated upon how the environment has been in the past. 
But the environment now plays a 'trick' on the bird. We know that something 
has gone wrong because adaptive success has not been facilitated (perhaps 
the bird dies of hunger in the first case and from poison in the second), but 
whatever has gone wrong is not related to the bird's individual mechanisms 
malfunctioning. 
If we now broaden our focus and talk about representation, instead of just 
belief, it is not difficult to see that Haugeland's example is nicely captured as 
one of mindless misrepresentation. It is perfectly parallel to the case of the 
perceptual illusion regarding the number of steps at your front door. 
Remember, in that situation you were —by hypothesis— functioning 
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normally and you certainly misrepresented the world in a specific way, viz. as 
containing three steps instead of four. Yet you were not responsible for the 
belief that led to your fall. Haugeland's example, likewise, displays a case of 
misrepresentation without malfunction, and without culpable error: a case of 
what can now be called mindless misrepresentation. And here lies the problem 
with Haugeland's analysis: he does not leave space for this important 
category. 
A distinction between malfunction and misrepresentation is certainly 
essential, but it is equally important to acknowledge this further distinction 
within the space of misrepresentation —between mindless and mindful ways of 
misrepresenting. Without this distinction we tend to be blind to the real (but 
limited) value of these naturalisation projects in semantics. The problem is not 
that a teleological view of content cannot account for the distinction between 
malfunction and misrepresentation. Teleological accounts can and do support 
that distinction. Where they fall short is in relation to a notion, not just of 
misrepresentation (misinforming), but of culpable misrepresentation —error 
that the system (agent, creature) could reasonably have been expected to 
avoid. In other words, teleological accounts can and do support the 
distinction between malfunction and mindless misrepresentation, but they fail 
to account for the more mindful ways of going wrong (and right). Since 
mindful beliefs are the most distinctively human, the spirit of Haugeland's 
critique remains intact, but the fine print is important because it helps us to 
appreciate the following: it's not that teleological views cannot account for the 
normativity of content. It is that they cannot account for the relevant kind of 
normativity, the strong normativity rooted in our participation in reason-
laden discourses. 
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Let me turn finally to a second application of our ideas, one concerning the 
nature of the content of perceptual experiences, in particular, the idea of non-
conceptual content as the characteristic kind of content of perceptual 
experiences (see e.g. Evans, 1982, Peacocke, 1992, and Cussins, 1992). Notice 
that one of Evans' main motivations for introducing the notion of non-
conceptual content was precisely the idea that the richness and grain of 
perceptual experience cannot be unpacked using the notion of belief, since 
'belief' really names a " ... far more sophisticated cognitive state: one that is 
connected with ... the notion of judgement, and so, also, connected with the 
notion of reasons"25. Unlike the content of perceptual experiences, beliefs were 
said to be intrinsically conceptualised. 
Now, if our notion of semantic responsibility is correct, then being "connected 
with the notion of judgement and the notion of reasons" is not criterial for 
being a belief, but only for being a particular kind of belief (a mindful belief). 
This might sound like a mere change of label, but I think there is more to it 
than that. Thus a subject who already knows about the Müller-Lyer illusion, 
believes (mindfully believes) the lines to be of equal length. The fact that the 
subject can't help but still represent one line as longer than the other is 
distinctive, or so I suggest, not of a more primitive informational state with 
such-and-such non-conceptual content, but of a different type of belief: 
mindless belief26. As a belief, it is conceptualised (and thus subject to the 
Generality Constraint. See Evans, op. cit., p. 103). Nonetheless, the subject 
can't help but believe that the lines look the way they look. No amount of 
learning would stop her from believing (mindlessly believing) that one line is 
longer than the other. If prompted, she might give us a detailed description of 
her experience and even admit that she just can't stop herself from seeing the 
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lines as having different lengths, regardless of her knowledge of the illusion. 
There is thus no room for reason-sensitive tuneability in the case of the 
perceptual belief and the conditions of semantic responsibility are not met. 
This, of course, is not the case with every perceptual experience. As I 
mentioned above, one can learn to perceive. One can learn e.g. to discern 
flavours in otherwise exotic foods. Once can (and should) learn to look for 
signs of boredom in one's students' and lovers' faces. To this extent, one can 
be liable, semantically responsible, for some of one's perceptual beliefs. There 
may thus be both mindful and mindless perceptual beliefs. However, most 
perceptual beliefs belong to the mindless category since most are the kind of 
beliefs "we form about our environment as we move about in it throughout 
our waking hours, most of them short-lived and many of them unconscious" 
(Alston, op. cit., p. 265). If this is the case, then we are not semantically 
responsible for most of our beliefs. 
Here, again, the notions of semantic and epistemic responsibility come apart. 
When reconstructing Alston's argument about deontological justification and 
control in Section 1, we saw that the immediate conclusion —the conclusion 
that follows from the explicit premises only— is that subjects are not 
epistemically responsible (i.e., are not deontologically justified) for believing 
most of what they believe. We noted that Alston's actual conclusion 
(involving a kind of reductio) depends on an implicit assumption that we are 
epistemically justified in believing most of what we believe. At that point, it 
was hinted that, despite Alston's intuitions, there may be no real problem in 
the view that we are simply not justified in believing most of what we believe. 
Now we can be more explicit about the reasons for feeling comfortable with 
this position. Since most of our beliefs are perceptual beliefs for which we are 
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not semantically responsible (since being semantically responsible means 
being tuneable by reasons), it would surely be rather odd to be held 
epistemically responsible for them. For we would then be epistemically 
responsible for items (the bulk of our beliefs) for which we bear no full-
blooded semantic responsibility. A finer-grained taxonomy of pathological, 
mindful, and mindless beliefs is, I claim, a tool that can help us avoid these 
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1 I shall use the terms 'responsibilism' / 'responsibilist' and 
'deontologism' / 'deontologist' as having, roughly, the same sense unless 
otherwise noted. For a precise characterisation of responsibilism as a subclass 
of deontologism see Lorraine Code (1987). 
2 There are, of course, as many reliabilist and responsibilist views of 
epistemic justification as advocates of either. The reliabilist group includes, 
among others, D. M. Armstrong (1973) and Alvin Goldman (1986, 1987, 1988) 
For responsibilism see e.g. L. BonJour (1985), R. Chisholm (1977, 1982) and S. 
Cohen (1984). For a very detailed map of current positions, especially of what 
it is known in the literature as 'virtue epistemology' see G. Axtell (1997). 
3 See Chisholm (1977, 1982). The fact that Chisholm is also well known 
as an internalist and foundationalist does not mean that the notion of 
epistemic responsibility is here presented as necessarily connected with those 
metaepistemological views. 
4 Alston's taxonomy is finer-grained than this since i) he suggests a 
category of control that is direct, yet non-basic (non-basic immediate control) 
and ii) he also subdivides the category of indirect, i.e. non-basic control, into 
two different kinds: long-range control, and indirect influence. These 
refinements do not affect our discussion. 
5 An interesting issue concerns whether or not the notion of control that 
applies when characterising intentional action can be applied in the analysis 
of beliefs. Some philosophers (e.g. M. Steup, 1988) claim that believing is 
indeed a subclass of human actions. Others (e.g. J. Heil, 1983) regard this idea 
as a deep mistake. Be this as it may, the general consensus is that there is 
nothing like direct voluntary control over any of our beliefs. 
6 For a subject to fulfil her epistemic responsibility is for her to follow 
some epistemic principles that allow her to form only those beliefs most likely 
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to be true (Ibid., p. 259). This 'likelihood' can be characterised in either 
internalist or externalist terms. 
7 If I am right, it could be argued (although I will not do so here) that the 
analysis of perceptual belief is not relevant to the concept of epistemic 
justification. 
8 E.g. Steup thinks that all that matters is that beliefs are somehow 
within our control and claims: "All this recent talk about doxastic voluntarism 
versus doxastic involuntarism, or direct versus indirect belief control, is really 
... a storm in a teacup". (Steup (1988), pp. 73-74). 
9 Alston opts for the (weaker) psychological version: 'we do not believe 
at will'. A stronger (logical) reading of this thesis would be expressed with the 
phrase 'cannot believe at will'. See Alston, op. cit., p. 263. 
10 As Dennett reminds us. See D. Dennett (1984), p. 52. 
11  I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me. 
12 See e.g. Descartes’ view of judgement as subject to the will and Locke’s 
discussion of the voluntariness of judgement in the book IV of the Essay. 
Thanks again to an anonymous referee for reminding me of these examples. 
13 Dan Dennett's Elbow Room (1984) provides an excellent discussion of 
these problems. 
14  The idea that responsibility is a precondition of voluntary control rather 
than the other way round echoes some of Strawson’s views in “Freedom and 
Resentment” (see Strawson, 1974)). Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
pointing this out to me. 
15  I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me. 
16  If, according to the traditional definition, one takes justification to be 
the property that should apply to beliefs in order for them to be knowledge, 
the notion of semantic responsibility could also apply to the concept of 
justification, at least under a reliabilist interpretation of the concept of 
justified belief (see e.g. Goldman, 1986, 1987). There could indeed be justified 
true mindless beliefs as well as justified true mindful beliefs. The first kind 
would constitute some kind of tacit knowledge, while the latter would be 
closer to what is known as explicit knowledge (see e.g. Davies 1986, 1989). 
However, the present account is neutral with regard to such epistemological 
issues. 
17  This category of belief, although important in itself, does not play a 
central role in the present paper. 
18 See Steup (1988), pp. 78-81 for a critical discussion of this example 
within an epistemological framework. 
19 It depends on one's social and political tastes which way to call it. 
20 Hence, a restricted interpretation of the tribe example introduces an 
interesting gap between the notion of semantic and epistemic responsibility. 
21 Both the setup of Alston's example and my suggestion of considering 
two different interpretations of the 'could' in ‘the subject could reasonably 
have been expected to fulfil her intellectual obligations’ may remind the 
reader of Goldman's distinction between weak and strong epistemic 
justification (cf. Goldman, 1988). The resemblance increases if we focus on the 
notion of blameless and nonculpable beliefs involved in Goldman's processes 
of weak justification. However, there are also important differences. Let me 
mention at least one. Goldman's distinction in based on how reliable the 
processes that lead to the formation of beliefs are and whether the subject can 
recognise them as reliable. But the reliability of empirical methods for 
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establishing the truth of a proposition is definitely not a property that figures 
in my notion of semantic responsibility. 
22 This clearly shows that Alston's notion of epistemic justification is such 
that meeting truth-conducivity standards is more important than fulfilling 
epistemic duties. 
23 A caveat. The fact that the subject can be held responsible for holding a 
belief does not entail though that the truth-value of the belief must be 
explicitly known by the subject. Otherwise, being semantically responsible 
would be far too demanding. It would actually be equivalent to being certain 
about the truth-value of what one believes. To meet semantic obligations is to 
engage in inferential practices and, of course, to do this is not a guarantee of 
truth. While this may be problematic in epistemology where the central 
concerns involve concepts such as justification, certainty or knowledge, it is 
not only admissible, but necessary in the semantic domain, since the content 
of a belief is independent of its truth-value. 
24 For a detailed analysis of the impact of my classification upon the topic 
of semantic naturalisation see Toribio (forthcoming). 
25 Evans (1982), p. 124. I am focusing here on Evans' treatment of the 
notion of non-conceptual content but this motivation is common among 
advocates of non-conceptual content. See e.g. Peacocke (1992), and Cussins 
(1992). 
26 Evans (1982) p. 123 explicitly mentions perceptual illusions as 
supporting evidence for the non-conceptual character of perceptual 
experiences. 
